The most prominent reasons for the aversion of major and regional powers to joining the coalition again with Saudi Arabia in Yemen

The Red Sea returns to the forefront of the global scene, but with new regional equations. The latest is Saudi Arabia’s attempt to gain at least international legitimacy to secure its oil, which has come under Yemeni fire. However, more importantly, there was international and regional aversion to the new coalition despite Saudi Arabia’s pumping of money and inducements to achieve it. What are the dimensions of those countries’ withdrawal and its causes?

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Last week, Saudi Arabia invited nearly 50 countries to participate in a military meeting in Riyadh. The goal was to finalize the meeting by signing a new coalition document under its leadership. However, contrary to Saudi expectations, which were high based on the Kingdom’s economic power and its control over the region in past decades, the coalition faded before it even began. Nothing remained of the Saudi coalition except remnants of fragmented and warring militias in Yemen and Sudan, in addition to islands submerged in the Maldives.

Although the American predictions published by the Trump administration following a meeting between Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman and US leaders in Washington were very high, specifying 50 countries, in the world’s view, Saudi Arabia is capable of mobilizing the entire world, its mercenaries, and its military capabilities, as it did when it launched the war on Yemen in March 2015. So, what has changed?

One of the most prominent calculations that led the participating countries in the Riyadh meeting to withdraw from the coalition or hesitate and refuse to join, according to experts, is the equation imposed by Yemen in recent years. Yemen has proven its capabilities to target any ship anywhere in the Middle East, during confrontations with the Israeli occupation or even America and Britain. These lessons were a driver for the two great powers to avoid confrontation again, prompting the rest of the European countries to follow suit, all having experienced the scale of the Yemeni hell in Bab Al-Mandeb and the Red Sea.

In addition to the Yemeni reality in the Red Sea, there are other equations related to the conflict between regional poles over influence and geopolitical interests, as demonstrated by the UAE and Israel, a strong coalition parallel to Saudi Arabia. Although both countries are weaker than facing Yemen, they oppose Saudi Arabia playing any role in the region, especially a leadership one. These parties have previously engaged in indirect confrontations and are still trying to expand in the Red Sea from the African side.

Saudi Arabia may have once believed that it had become a strong regional power by virtue of oil. However, the new reality in the region confirms that it has become the weakest link in the equation. Its oil now flows between the Strait of Hormuz and Bab Al-Mandeb, and this alone is not enough to impose it as a regional power. Countries that were never mentioned have now become players that international and regional calculations are made for, turning the equation upside down.