The Yemeni Armed Forces’ announcement of a ban on Saudi navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden provided clear confirmation that the equations of the new phase of the conflict with the Saudi coalition are very different from those of past phases. However, this is not because Sana’a merely wants to surprise Riyadh with new tools, but because the reality in which the conflict is taking place has become completely different, a matter Riyadh is likely to fail to understand quickly enough.
Dherar Al-Tayyeb – Al-Khabar Al-Yemeni:
A Real Blockade:
The title “siege with siege,” which includes the naval ban equation, does not mean that Sana’a today is executing a military escalation that matches in some respects the economic siege Yemen is subjected to, as was the case when oil facilities were targeted before the 2022 truce. Rather, it means imposing a sanctions regime similar in nature to the Saudi siege but through legitimate mechanisms and with an ethical goal.
The siege imposed by Saudi Arabia was not based solely on military tools but on geopolitical and economic influence, diplomatic relations, and a politicized global and regional trade system. Therefore, the truce alone was not enough to end this siege. Similarly, the ban imposed on Saudi navigation today is not based solely on Sana’a’s military capabilities but on a new reality imposed by Sana’a over the past two years through military and non-military tools. Alongside anti-ship missiles, naval drones, fast boats, and unmanned submarines, the legitimacy and morality of Sana’a’s stance supporting Gaza, the sensitive yet flexible nature of shipping markets, and the phase of transformations in regional and international power balances, solidified by the United States’ defeat in the Red Sea, were key factors that contributed to establishing the sanctions regime that made the Red Sea forbidden for Israeli ships. This was solidified as a fait accompli to the extent that Eilat port remained closed even after the Gaza ceasefire and Sana’a’s announcement of suspending its naval operations.
The early effects of announcing the Saudi navigation ban clearly reflected this. The shipping sector did not wait for a violating ship to be targeted to start responding to the new situation. It did not think of giving Saudi Arabia a chance to prove the accuracy of its statement about its ability to protect ships. The messages received by shipping companies from the Sana’a Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center regarding the ban were enough for tankers carrying Saudi oil to Asia to start using the Suez Canal as an exit from the Red Sea instead of the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait, and for many other ships heading to Saudi Arabia in the Gulf of Aden to change course and turn back.
The increase in war risk premiums on Red Sea shipments, just hours after the announcement of the Saudi navigation ban, also confirms that the shipping industry is now well aware that Sana’a’s declaration of imposing naval sanctions is “something that must be taken seriously, not just rhetoric,” according to “Marisks” for maritime risk management. This is not due to the “ease” of disrupting navigation as some analysts claim, but to the fact that Sana’a has proven its ability to implement focused and precise sanctions and challenge any efforts to undermine them, whatever they may be. The coming days will reveal that the newly increased insurance premiums are exclusively related to ships and shipments linked to Saudi Arabia, just as was the case during the blockade period on American, Israeli, and British ships. The British maritime security company “Ambrey” clearly confirmed that the high risks associated with the Yemeni ban are concentrated on ships owned or operated by Riyadh or visiting the Kingdom’s ports, and that they could extend to companies dealing with those ports. Lloyd’s List also indicated that ships belonging to Saudi companies “Bahri” and “Aramco” top the list of assets most at risk in market assessments. This will become even more entrenched after the attack on the Saudi ships “Ancilia” and “Layla.”
The shipping sector watched the United States and Israel completely fail to protect ships subject to Yemeni sanctions, as well as to stop Yemeni naval operations in support of Gaza, not only at the operational level but even at the diplomatic level. The United States could not mobilize any full regional or international support for its efforts against Yemen, and the partial support provided was useless. It later watched the Saudi-Emirati conflict develop into Abu Dhabi’s expulsion from the Saudi coalition and its withdrawal from the Riyadh-led OPEC organization. It also watched Iran impose a new reality in the Strait of Hormuz despite the West and the Gulf. Therefore, when Sana’a announces a ban on Saudi navigation, it is natural for the shipping sector not to wait for promises of “forming a coalition to protect navigation,” let alone Saudi or American unilateral protection. The response to the sanctions will be the best option.
This is why leading shipping expert Lars Jensen affirms that the ban on Saudi navigation has already begun to bear fruit immediately, explaining that: “The goal of the blockade is to prevent ships from crossing, and if that can be achieved for some ships by mere threat without actual attacks, then the blockade is considered partially successful.”
What is Saudi Arabia Facing?
Because the shipping sector has had to adapt to some extent to the new situation created by the Yemeni sanctions regime, by adopting the “Cape of Good Hope” route as an alternative path for sanctioned ships, the first thing Saudi crude oil tankers that received Yemeni warnings thought of was heading towards the Suez Canal to circumvent the African continent. This illustrates the extent to which the impact can widen. After the Israeli, American, and British navigation ban led to the reshaping of the international navigation map according to a “new normal” based on linking the possibility of crossing the Red Sea to the developments of the ongoing conflict in the region, the Saudi navigation ban today paves the way for the “reshaping of global oil trade flows,” according to “Kpler.”
Shipping brokerage firm “Bremar” states that the Yemeni ban has begun “raising serious questions about the viability of eastbound routes from the Saudi port of Yanbu” while the closure of the Strait of Hormuz continues.
This effect clearly reflects the significant difference between the current phase of the conflict between Sana’a and the Saudi coalition and previous phases. The nightmare of Saudi oil facilities being bombed is no longer the only thing Riyadh must prioritize avoiding in its policymaking. Damaging Saudi Arabia’s status as a reliable oil source, even in times of crisis, represents a similar nightmare for the Kingdom. This is especially true in a situation where everyone is openly discussing the readiness to coexist with scenarios of significantly higher oil prices, meaning the world will not “rush” to protect Saudi oil export routes if it sees this goal as unachievable, just as it did not rush to open the Strait of Hormuz.
The transformation of Saudi Red Sea ports into high-risk destinations for the shipping sector in general, now that Gulf ports have also become so, will be a real catastrophe for the Kingdom. It is enough for very few major shipping companies to decide to stop sailing to Jeddah, Jizan, or Yanbu for the “domino effect” to spread quickly in the market. Saudi Arabia will need more than just a reassurance statement or even a “truce” to restore the confidence of shipping lines. This is not mere speculation; to this day, shipping companies refuse to sail to the Israeli port of Eilat, which was subjected to a Yemeni blockade during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle.
While Riyadh previously succeeded in avoiding the nightmare of bombing oil facilities by containing matters with a “ceasefire” or “de-escalation” with Sana’a, these tools will not work today to avoid the blockade of ports and the ban on oil exports. What Saudi Arabia is facing is not a military escalation but real economic sanctions that cannot be avoided except by meeting the conditions set by Sana’a, namely ending the siege, aggression, and occupation.
If Riyadh believes that a “partial truce deal” can push Sana’a to end the naval blockade on its ports while Yemen remains subject to air or naval restrictions, economic and military targeting, or Saudi guardianship, it risks missing the opportunity to remedy the situation. The era in which Sana’a’s options to end the aggression, siege, and occupation are constrained by any diplomatic formula has ended, with a clear commitment from the Yemeni leadership before a people demanding resolution. This is precisely why they moved towards imposing advanced equations suitable for the new phase, such as the “siege with siege” equation.
The truth is that many indications suggest Riyadh is indeed reading the situation incorrectly. At the same time as it sends mediators to negotiate with Sana’a and avoid a major escalation explosion, it shows a clear attachment to its old bets on the American and Israeli position and on mercenaries. This means that the “deal” it is prepared to conclude focuses on preventing Sana’a from moving to change the status quo that has existed for years, in exchange for some “privileges” that do not rise to the level of the demand to “end Saudi guardianship over Yemen.”
Lifting air restrictions on Sana’a International Airport – for example – may be on the table, and this is an important achievement for Sana’a. However, if the counterpart is restricting Sana’a’s options to address the rest of the files, or imposing mercenaries as a party to the deal, then this does not align with the discourse of the new phase launched by the Yemeni leadership. The fact that it clings to the bet on the “Al-Alimi” government and on the Americans indicates that this is the type of deals Riyadh is currently offering.
While Sana’a shows clear concern not to close the doors of negotiation and peaceful solutions, the ceiling of the national position in the new phase requires it to change the mechanism of dealing with mediators, proposals, and diplomatic offers, completely transcending the box of partial solutions, and not giving any room for gaining time and procrastination. This has been clearly demonstrated by Sana’a’s move to announce the Saudi navigation ban, after Riyadh tried to contain the “airport for airport” equation through a Jordanian flight and a blatant offer by mercenaries regarding operating Sana’a Airport. The operation targeting two Saudi ships also showed that the naval ban announcement was not just a statement aimed at creating negotiating pressure.
It can be said that time is pressing on both Sana’a and Riyadh, but not in the same way. The popular position, which treats the new phase as a phase of “resolution,” pushes Sana’a to show great firmness and close the doors of procrastination. This places Riyadh before the necessity of completely changing its view of the situation and not risking testing the ceiling of Sana’a’s position, because the new phase of the conflict has become a reality that even Sana’a cannot postpone or retreat from, even if it wanted to.
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